RLUIPA and Eminent Domain: Probing the Boundaries of Religious Land Use Protection by Baker, Matthew
BYU Law Review
Volume 2008 | Issue 4 Article 4
11-1-2008
RLUIPA and Eminent Domain: Probing the
Boundaries of Religious Land Use Protection
Matthew Baker
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Land Use Law Commons, Property Law and Real Estate Commons, and the Religion
Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Matthew Baker, RLUIPA and Eminent Domain: Probing the Boundaries of Religious Land Use Protection, 2008 BYU L. Rev. 1213 (2008).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2008/iss4/4
BAKER.FIN 10/11/2008 1:47 PM 
 
1213 
RLUIPA and Eminent Domain: Probing the 
Boundaries of Religious Land Use Protection 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 
2000 (RLUIPA)1 passed through Congress “by unanimous 
consent”2 and was signed into law by President Clinton on 
September 22, 2000.3 RLUIPA, described generally as “a bill 
designed to protect the free exercise of religion from unnecessary 
governmental interference,”4 represents the most recent in a series of 
congressional responses to the Supreme Court’s restrictive rendering 
of the Free Exercise Clause in Employment Division v. Smith, in 
which the Court held that neutral, generally applicable laws need 
only satisfy rational basis analysis, even though they may place 
burdens on free exercise rights.5 Eager to reinstate a strict scrutiny 
standard in free exercise jurisprudence, Congress first attempted to 
countermand the Smith ruling with passage of the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).6 However, in City of 
Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court held that RFRA was 
unconstitutional and inapplicable to the states because it exceeded 
Congress’s remedial powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.7 After failing to pass a replacement for RFRA called the 
 
 1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000). 
 2. 146 CONG. REC. E1563 (2000) (statement of Rep. Charles T. Canady). 
 3. See Statement on the Signing of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act of 2000, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1905, 1906 (Sept. 22, 2000) (“This Act recognizes the 
importance the free exercise of religion plays in our democratic society.”). 
 4. 146 CONG. REC. H7190 (2000) (statement of Rep. Charles T. Canady). 
 5. 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, as recognized 
in Francis v. Mineta, 505 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 2007). Although the statute superseded the Smith 
holding for a time, the Supreme Court struck down 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb as unconstitutional in 
City of Boerne. See infra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000), amended by Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act § 7, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-4 (2000). 
 7. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. 
2000cc, as recognized in Spratt v. Wall, No. 04-112, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33266 (D.R.I. 
Nov. 21, 2005); 146 CONG. REC. E1563 (2000) (statement of Rep. Charles T. Canady) 
(describing how the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Boerne resulted in the elimination of 
any and all RFRA application to the states so that it remained “applicable only to the federal 
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Religious Liberty Protection Act (RLPA) in 19988 and 1999,9 
Congress decided to narrow its focus in RLUIPA to two key areas: 
land use regulation and state institutions.10 
Academics have already produced a significant body of 
scholarship and criticism on RLUIPA,11 focusing broadly on the 
debate surrounding RLUIPA’s constitutionality,12 discussion of its 
legislative merits,13 and evaluation of its effectiveness.14 By contrast, 
legal scholars have directed far less attention to unanswered 
questions suggested by the vagueness of the law’s scope and many of 
its provisions. For example, while RLUIPA imprecisely defines “land 
use regulation” as “a zoning or landmarking law, or the application 
of such a law, that limits or restricts a claimant’s use or development 
of land,”15 it also calls for broad statutory construction.16 Under 
 
government”); see also Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 959–60 (10th Cir. 2001) 
(concluding that RFRA remains applicable to the federal government). 
 8. Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998, H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. (1998). 
 9. Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. (1999). 
 10. 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch and Sen. 
Edward M. Kennedy); see generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000). 
 11. For an extensive but incomplete list, see Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, 
RLUIPA Scholarship, http://www.rluipa.com/index.php/topic/21.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 
2008) (listing law review articles). 
 12. See, e.g., Caroline R. Adams, Note, The Constitutional Validity of the Religious Land 
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: Will RLUIPA’s Strict Scrutiny Survive the 
Supreme Court’s Strict Scrutiny, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2361 (2002); Ariel Graff, Comment, 
Calibrating the Balance of Free Exercise, Religious Establishment, and Land Use Regulation: Is 
RLUIPA an Unconstitutional Response to an Overstated Problem?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 485 
(2005). RLUIPA’s constitutionality was upheld by the first court addressing the issue. See 
Freedom Baptist Church of Del. County v. Twp. of Middletown, 204 F. Supp. 2d 857, 863 
(E.D. Pa. 2002). The only court to strike down RLUIPA on constitutionality grounds was 
overturned on appeal. See Elsinore Christian Ctr. v. City of Lake Elsinore, 291 F. Supp. 2d 
1083, 1104 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (“[RLUIPA] was enacted without the ambit of congressional 
authority, and is therefore unconstitutional.”), rev’d, 456 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2006). This 
Comment will only address the issue of constitutionality as it is relevant to the application of 
RLUIPA in eminent domain proceedings. 
 13. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind 
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311 (2003); Stephen A. 
Haller, Comment, On Sacred Ground: Exploring Congress’s Attempts to Rein in Discriminatory 
State Zoning Practices, 33 SW. U. L. REV. 285 (2004). 
 14. See, e.g., Note, Religious Land Use in the Federal Courts under RLUIPA, 120 HARV. 
L. REV. 2178, 2179 (2007); Sara Smolik, Note, The Utility and Efficacy of the RLUIPA: Was 
It a Waste?, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 723, 723 (2004). 
 15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-8(5) (2000). 
 16. Id. § 2000cc-5(g) (“This Act shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of 
religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this Act and the 
Constitution.”). 
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RLUIPA’s regime, courts hearing arguments in the context of 
religious land use thus face the daunting challenge of determining 
the boundaries of RLUIPA’s application and force, with little clear 
guidance from the statute’s terms. Perhaps Congress intended the 
vague language as a means of securing the broadest possible 
protection for religious exercise without running afoul of its 
constitutional limitations. Whatever the case, RLUIPA leaves to the 
courts the task of tracing the appropriate lines. 
One of the most interesting border disputes to arise from this 
vagueness problem is whether the statute’s definition of “land use 
regulation” should be construed broadly enough to include eminent 
domain proceedings.17 In the first case to hear the issue, Cottonwood 
Christian Center v. City of Cypress,18 a federal district court held that 
the city’s denial of a conditional use permit and invocation of 
eminent domain against the church were subject to strict scrutiny 
under RLUIPA.19 The court noted that, “[e]ven if the Court were 
only considering the condemnation proceedings, they would fall 
under RLUIPA’s definition of ‘land use regulation’ . . . [because the 
City’s] authority to exercise eminent domain . . . is based on a 
zoning system developed by the City.”20 Apparently classifying the 
eminent domain proceedings as “the application of such a [zoning] 
law,”21 the Cottonwood court adhered to RLUIPA’s broad 
construction clause and marked the first boundary line accordingly. 
 
 17. At the commencement of this writing, only two commentators had addressed, in 
cursory fashion, the issues involved in extending RLUIPA’s protection to the eminent domain 
context. See Shelley Ross Saxer, Eminent Domain Actions Targeting First Amendment Land 
Uses, 69 MO. L. REV. 653, 662 (2004) (concluding that RLUIPA “provide[s] a strict scrutiny 
review standard . . . for any eminent domain action used to exclude or unreasonably limit 
religious assemblies”); G. David Mathues, Note, Shadow of a Bulldozer?: RLUIPA and 
Eminent Domain After Kelo, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1653, 1696 (2006) (concluding 
without significant analysis that “RLUIPA’s definition of land use regulation includes eminent 
domain actions”). Since then, three commentators have more squarely addressed the issue. See 
Cristina Finetti, Comment, Limiting the Scope of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act: Why RLUIPA Should Not Be Amended to Regulate Eminent Domain Actions 
Against Religious Property, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 667 (2008); Daniel N. Lerman, Note, 
Taking the Temple: Eminent Domain and the Limits of RLUIPA, 96 GEO. L.J. 2057 (2008); 
Alison Scaduto, Comment, RLUIPA as a Possible Shield from the Government Taking of 
Religious Property, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 823 (2008). 
 18. 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 19. Id. at 1220–22. 
 20. Id. at 1222 n.9. 
 21. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-8(5) (2000)). 
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Subsequent courts have not been so eager to follow that 
congressional mandate. For example, in St. John’s United Church of 
Christ v. City of Chicago,22 the court took a much narrower view of 
RLUIPA’s land use definition and the Cottonwood court’s analysis: 
This Court is not willing to take such an expansive view, nor does it 
believe that Cottonwood stands for such a sweeping proposition. 
While this Court may not agree with the passing reference to 
eminent domain in Cottonwood, that case can be read to suggest 
that RLUIPA is applicable to the specific eminent domain actions 
where the condemnation proceeding is intertwined with other 
actions by the city involving zoning regulations.23 
Another district court went further, holding without reservation 
that RLUIPA does not apply to eminent domain proceedings.24 It 
concluded that zoning laws and eminent domain were “two distinct 
[legal] concepts,”25 pointed to the absence of eminent domain in the 
statutory language,26 and criticized the Cottonwood court’s reasoning 
as “not ‘persuasive as it relates to such an attenuated relationship 
between eminent domain and zoning.’”27 
With the battle lines clearly drawn, this Comment will probe the 
boundaries of RLUIPA to determine whether eminent domain is 
properly subject to its mandate. In spite of strong opinions to the 
contrary, this Comment will argue that application of RLUIPA to 
eminent domain proceedings is appropriate and reasonable given the 
close causal nexus between zoning laws and eminent domain, the 
broad construction of RLUIPA, and the substance of its 
congressional record. This is especially true in cases like Cottonwood, 
where the city appeared to initiate eminent domain proceedings 
specifically to prevent the church from locating and developing on 
the property.28 Even a limited application of RLUIPA better serves 
 
 22. 401 F. Supp. 2d 887 (N.D. Ill. 2005), aff’d, 502 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. 
denied, 128 S. Ct. 2431 (2008). 
 23. Id. at 900. 
 24. See Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F. Supp. 2d 250, 257 
(W.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[T]he Town’s employment of eminent domain to obtain the land is 
simply too far removed from any zoning regulations to fall within the purview of RLUIPA.”). 
 25. Id. at 254. 
 26. Id. at 255. 
 27. Id. at 257 (citation omitted). 
 28. Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. City of Cypress, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1231 (C.D. 
Cal. 2002) (“Although the City contends that Cottonwood is disturbing its long-planned 
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the purposes of the statute and free exercise jurisprudence than a 
complete denial of protection. In short, the Cottonwood court traced 
the correct boundary. 
Part II of this Comment will first summarize the facts and 
analyze the reasoning of the few court cases addressing the 
application of RLUIPA to eminent domain proceedings in an effort 
to evaluate the strength of each court’s treatment of the issue within 
the particular facts of the case. Next, Part III will examine the 
relationship between zoning regulations and eminent domain and 
argue that, in spite of their differences, the application of RLUIPA to 
eminent domain proceedings is reasonable and justified—and not 
legally untenable as some courts have held.29 Part IV will then 
investigate RLUIPA’s enactment and the degree to which the 
statutory language and congressional record allow for an extension 
of protection to eminent domain even in the absence of specific 
language to that effect. Ultimately, Congress intended RLUIPA to 
provide broad protection for religious land uses constrained by land 
use regulation throughout the country. Despite the generally 
negative treatment of the Cottonwood court’s analysis by subsequent 
courts faced with this issue, the court of first impression has been the 
most faithful to the spirit and meaning of RLUIPA.  
II. RLUIPA AS APPLIED TO EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE COURTS 
With RLUIPA, religious land use litigation most often involves 
zoning disputes.30 Zoning laws and regulations impact the “use, 
building, or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious 
exercise”31 far more frequently than eminent domain proceedings, 
which are rare by comparison. In fact, since RLUIPA’s passage in 
2000, only five cases have dealt directly with eminent domain 
proceedings, beginning with Cottonwood. These cases seem to reveal 
considerable conflict and tension in the construction of RLUIPA and 
conception of zoning laws and eminent domain. However, it is 
unclear whether this tension arises primarily from critical 
 
development efforts, it was only after Cottonwood purchased that land that the City moved 
aggressively to find other uses for the property.”). 
 29. See, e.g., Faith Temple Church, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 254–58. 
 30. See Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Cases, http://www.rluipa.com/ 
index.php/case/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2008) (providing a comprehensive, but not complete, 
listing of RLUIPA cases). 
 31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-8(7)(B) (2000). 
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disagreements between courts, or if the divergent outcomes are 
better explained with reference to the particular facts of each case. 
Ultimately, if this trend continues, the Supreme Court will have to 
determine RLUIPA’s scope. 
A. Cottonwood Christian Center v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency 
In Cottonwood, the fast-growing Cottonwood Christian Church 
was no longer able to accommodate its large congregation. To solve 
the problem, the church spent five years finding a more suitable 
location, eventually acquiring adjacent plots of land in a blighted 
redevelopment zone. In total, the church amassed eighteen acres of 
property, which it hoped to develop into a large church facility.32 
While churches were permitted on the property acquired by 
Cottonwood, city officials informed the church that the development 
may not be “consistent with the goals and objectives of the 
Redevelopment Plan.”33 In accordance with zoning regulations, 
Cottonwood submitted an application for a conditional use permit. 
However, city officials were making plans to build a Town Center on 
the property, and denied the church’s application. Shortly thereafter, 
the City Council adopted a moratorium on discretionary land use 
permits for the property, effectively preventing Cottonwood from 
moving forward.34 
After the city determined that its Town Center plan was not 
feasible, it decided to pursue a scaled-down, eighteen-acre retail 
project to be located on Cottonwood’s property. The project 
involved a Costco warehouse store. The city sent letters to the 
church to determine whether Cottonwood had interest in the 
project, but Cottonwood responded that it still wanted to build a 
church.35 As a result, the city offered to purchase the Cottonwood 
property.36 When Cottonwood refused, the city initiated eminent 
domain proceedings to acquire the land.37 Cottonwood then 
brought suit in federal court, claiming violations of its rights and 
seeking an injunction.38 It argued, in part, that the city’s actions, 
 
 32. Cottonwood, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1211–14. 
 33. Id. at 1213. 
 34. Id. at 1213–14. 
 35. Id. at 1214. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 1214–15. 
 38. Id. at 1215. 
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including the eminent domain proceedings, should be subject to 
strict scrutiny as required by RLUIPA.39 
The district court held that, under RLUIPA, strict scrutiny 
should be applied for two reasons.40 First, Cottonwood’s proposed 
development project would substantially affect interstate 
commerce.41 Second, the city’s refusal to grant a conditional use 
permit “involves a ‘land use regulation . . . under which a 
government makes . . . individualized assessments.’”42 The city had 
argued that only the eminent domain proceedings should be at issue, 
and that “the exercise of eminent domain is not a ‘land use 
regulation’ under RLUIPA.”43 But the court had already concluded 
that the permit denial and eminent domain proceedings were 
inextricably linked by the facts of the case.44 Moreover, the court 
stated that, even excluding the permit denial, RLUIPA applies 
because eminent domain proceedings fall under the statutory 
definition of “land use regulation.”45 Finally, in a related free-
exercise analysis, the court further determined that, along with its 
actions in denying the conditional use permit, the city’s 
condemnation efforts “are individualized assessments,” thus fulfilling 
RLUIPA’s jurisdictional requirement.46 
In this case of first impression, the court took a broad view of 
RLUIPA’s definitions and jurisdictional provisions. Based on the 
close connection between the city’s zoning laws and redevelopment 
plans, and its eminent domain proceedings against the Cottonwood 
property, the court treated eminent domain as a logical application 
of the city’s zoning practices, thus broadly interpreting the statutory 
definition of “land use regulation.”47 The court also firmly 
established RLUIPA jurisdiction over eminent domain, based on 
 
 39. Id. at 1219–20. 
 40. Id. at 1221. 
 41. Id. at 1221–22. 
 42. Id. at 1222 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C) (2000)). 
 43. Id. at 1222 n.9. 
 44. See id. at 1219 (“If the [c]ity has wrongfully failed to grant Cottonwood a CUP for 
its church construction, then Defendants’ attempt to condemn land that had zoning 
entitlements becomes a more difficult endeavor.”). 
 45. Id. at 1222 n.9. 
 46. Id. at 1223. 
 47. See id. at 1222 n.9. 
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both the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.48 
B. Courts Responding to Cottonwood 
Subsequent courts have largely disagreed with Cottonwood’s 
broad view of RLUIPA’s boundaries in the eminent domain context. 
1. Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton49 
In Faith Temple, the court signaled a distinct break from the 
Cottonwood analysis. Faith Temple involved a religious congregation 
that had outgrown its former location and that sought a larger 
property on which to build a church complex.50 Eventually the 
church purchased a sixty-six-acre parcel immediately east of a park 
owned by the town.51 The town, which claimed to be “surprised by 
Faith Temple’s action,” had previously sought to acquire the parcel 
to permit expansion of the park, but failed to agree on a suitable 
price with the former owner.52 A few months after purchase of the 
land by Faith Temple, the town began eminent domain proceedings 
to acquire the land.53 The church brought suit alleging violation of 
RLUIPA, among other claims,54 relying in part on the Cottonwood 
court’s analysis.55 
However, the Faith Temple court adopted a much narrower view 
of RLUIPA than did the Cottonwood court. In clear contrast to 
Cottonwood, the court held that the eminent domain proceedings at 
issue in the case “do not amount to a ‘zoning law’ or ‘the 
application of such a law.’”56 The court based its conclusion on the 
status of zoning laws and eminent domain as “two distinct concepts” 
in New York state law,57 and on the absence of eminent domain in 
 
 48. See id. at 1221–22. The Cottonwood court refers to Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as the Enforcement Clause. See id. at 1221. 
 49. 405 F. Supp. 2d 250 (W.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 50. Id. at 251. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 251–52. 
 54. Id. at 252. 
 55. Id. at 256. 
 56. Id. at 254. 
 57. Id. 
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the statutory definition.58 In response to Faith Temple’s argument 
that Congress “would have wanted RLUIPA to apply” to the 
particular facts of the case, the court curtly observed: “The statute 
says what it says. Congress made no mention of eminent domain, 
and it is not the Court’s proper function to add language to the 
statute in order to stretch its applicability to suit the aspirations of a 
particular litigant.”59 In addition, the court concluded that “the 
connection between the eminent domain proceedings and any of the 
town’s zoning laws is too attenuated to constitute the application of 
a zoning law.”60 It firmly rejected as unpersuasive the Cottonwood 
court’s suggestion “that any exercise of eminent domain that relates 
in some way to a zoning plan falls within the scope of RLUIPA.”61 
2. St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago62 
In St. John’s, the courts again decided to exclude eminent 
domain proceedings from the scope of RLUIPA. St. John’s involved 
efforts by the City of Chicago to acquire parcels of land adjacent to 
O’Hare airport, including land owned by a cemetery affiliated with 
St. John’s Church, in order to facilitate expansion.63 Initially, the city 
was enjoined from proceeding because it failed to follow the 
required administrative procedure by obtaining approval from the 
state Department of Transportation.64 In response to the injunction, 
the city requested that the Illinois General Assembly pass the O’Hare 
Modernization Act (OMA), which effectively stripped the Illinois 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of any power to prevent the 
relocation of cemeteries or graves as part of the modernization 
plan.65 As the city moved forward with its plans to acquire the land 
through eminent domain, it “carefully considered the concerns of 
 
 58. Id. at 254–55. The court further stated that, while the statute’s clear meaning 
rendered unnecessary consideration of legislative intent, analysis of RLUIPA’s legislative intent 
also failed to support the church’s position. Id. at 255. 
 59. Id. at 255. 
 60. Id. at 256. 
 61. Id. at 256–57. 
 62. The St. John’s case was heard by both a federal district court, see 401 F. Supp. 2d 
887 (N.D. Ill. 2005), and the Seventh Circuit on appeal, see 502 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2007), 
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2431 (2008). 
 63. St. John’s, 502 F.3d at 620–621. 
 64. St. John’s, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 890–91. 
 65. Id. at 891. 
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the religious entities in an exhaustive review.”66 Unsatisfied, 
however, St. John’s Church filed numerous claims against Chicago, 
its mayor, and the State of Illinois, including alleged violations of 
RLUIPA and the Constitution’s Free Exercise and Due Process 
Clauses.67 
At trial, the district court held that “RLUIPA does not apply” to 
the city’s eminent domain proceedings against the St. John’s 
cemetery.68 It distinguished the facts of the case from Cottonwood, 
stating that “[n]othing in the [case] leads to the inference that the 
City’s authority to acquire the land stems from any zoning 
regulations or landmarking law.”69 Commenting further, the court 
declined to take Cottonwood’s “expansive view” of RLUIPA’s 
provisions.70 Instead, the court underscored the absence of any 
reference to “takings” in the statute and its own perception of the 
differences between zoning laws and eminent domain, concluding 
“that the [c]ity does not act pursuant to a zoning or landmarking 
law.”71 At the same time, the court noted that “this should not be 
taken to mean that all condemnation proceedings necessarily are 
outside the scope of RLUIPA,” leaving the question open for further 
review.72 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court that 
RLUIPA did not apply to the eminent domain proceedings at issue 
in the case.73 The court extended the discussion contained in 
previous cases, including Faith Temple and the St. John’s district 
court ruling, that approached zoning laws and eminent domain as 
distinct concepts: “As Illinois courts have long recognized, the 
‘police power [zoning] and eminent domain are distinct powers of 
government.’”74 Dismissing the Cottonwood statements as “brief 
dicta,” the Seventh Circuit concluded that 
 
 66. St. John’s, 502 F.3d at 635. 
 67. St. John’s, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 891–92. 
 68. Id. at 899. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 900. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chi., 502 F.3d 616, 641–642 (7th 
Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2431 (2008). 
 74. Id. at 640 (quoting Sanitary Dist. of Chi. v. Chi. & Alton R.R. Co., 108 N.E. 312, 
314 (Ill. 1915)) (alteration in original). 
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[g]iven the importance of eminent domain as a governmental 
power affecting land use, we think that if Congress had wanted to 
include eminent domain within RLUIPA, it would have said 
something. . . . Congress did not mention eminent domain in so 
many words in RLUIPA’s definition of a land use regulation, which 
is enough for us to consider it excluded.75 
The court, in ruling that RLUIPA intentionally excluded 
eminent domain, viewed RLUIPA’s boundaries even more narrowly 
than the district court, which found that RLUIPA is not necessarily 
inapplicable to all condemnation cases.76 
3. City of Honolulu v. Sherman77 
In City of Honolulu, Hawaii’s Supreme Court roughly followed 
the reasoning of the Faith Temple and St. John’s courts. The case 
involved eminent domain proceedings executed on a condominium 
complex owned by the First United Methodist Church.78 At issue 
was a city ordinance that authorized the city to acquire through 
eminent domain “the fee simple interest in land situated underneath 
condominium developments from the fee owners of the land in 
order to convey fee simple title to the owner-occupants of the 
condominium units.”79 In response to the condemnation 
proceedings, First United filed suit for violations of its federal and 
state constitutional rights and invoked RLUIPA as a defense to the 
condemnation and conversion action.80 At trial, the court ruled that 
“RLUIPA is inapplicable as a defense to conversion.”81  
In the first state appellate court case to address RLUIPA’s 
application to eminent domain, Hawaii’s Supreme Court affirmed 
the lower court’s ruling.82 The Court began by discussing the 
statutory definition of “land use regulation” and the nature of 
zoning and landmarking laws. It concluded that to correctly apply 
RLUIPA the city’s action “must pertain either (1) to the division of 
a city into districts and the regulation of the land usage within those 
 
 75. Id. at 641. 
 76. Id. 
 77. City of Honolulu v. Sherman, 129 P.3d 542 (Haw. 2006). 
 78. Id. at 546. 
 79. Id. at 545. 
 80. Id. at 546. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 547. 
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districts or (2) to a monument, marker, or building having historical 
significance.”83 The Court then marshaled support for its view from 
previous decisions in St. John’s and Faith Temple, which denied the 
applicability of RLUIPA to eminent domain proceedings.84 
Moreover, it directly addressed First United’s argument that the 
Cottonwood decision stood for the proposition that all exercises of 
eminent domain are subject to RLUIPA: 
The fact that the Cottonwood court denominated the authority of 
the Cypress, California Redevelopment Agency to exercise its 
power of eminent domain as being “based on a zoning system” has 
no bearing on the present matter. The [Cypress] Redevelopment 
Agency’s authority apparently emanated from “the Resolution of 
Necessity” and a zoning system developed by that city, which by 
no means signifies that all exercises of eminent domain are 
grounded in a zoning system.85 
Because the city ordinance at issue operated independent of any 
zoning system or regulation, the eminent domain proceedings could 
not have been construed as a zoning law subject to RLUIPA.86 
However, the court failed to specifically consider whether the 
proceedings in question could be the application of a zoning law. 
4. Albanian Associated Fund v. Township of Wayne87 
The district court of New Jersey decided the most recent 
eminent domain RLUIPA case, in which Albanian Associated, a 
growing Muslim congregation, acquired an eleven-acre tract of land 
on which it hoped “to provide a place of public worship and prayer 
in accordance with the traditions of the Islamic religion.”88 The 
property, which had always been undeveloped, was located in a land 
use zone that categorized a church building as a conditional use 
requiring city approval and that the city maintained was “defined by 
ordinance as ‘environmentally sensitive.’”89 The city claimed that 
prior to Albanian Associated’s acquisition of the land it had 
 
 83. Id. at 561. 
 84. Id. at 561–62. 
 85. Id. at 564. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Albanian Associated Fund v. Twp. of Wayne, No. 06-CV-3217, 2007 WL 2904194 
(D.N.J. Oct. 1, 2007). 
 88. Id. at *1. 
 89. Id. 
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announced a proposal to preserve open spaces in the city.90 While 
Albanian Associated’s land development application remained 
pending, and “nearly two and a half years after the open space 
proposal was first introduced,” residents approved the Open Space 
Referendum, “which would put aside a portion of resident tax 
dollars to purchase and preserve open spaces.”91 One councilman 
offered testimony suggesting that “the plaintiff’s application to build 
its Mosque” was a principal reason behind the Referendum. The city 
then formed an Open Space Committee, which determined that the 
plaintiff’s property would be subject to the initiative. However, the 
record showed no indication that the township ever notified 
Albanian Associated of its decision.92 
After several meetings were held to discuss the plaintiff’s 
property, the Council decided to move forward with plans to acquire 
the land.93 In spite of the suspicious circumstances, several Council 
members testified in deposition “that the decision to acquire the 
property was not motivated by an improper purpose.”94 The 
township offered the plaintiff monetary compensation and suggested 
alternative locations for the mosque.95 The plaintiff found that the 
alternative sites suggested were not available for acquisition and 
rejected the offer, at which point the township initiated 
condemnation proceedings. In response, the plaintiff brought suit 
for violations of RLUIPA and moved for a preliminary injunction 
against the township. During the hearing on that motion, “it was 
made apparent that despite approximately 102 properties identified 
for the Open Space and Recreation Plan, only the plaintiff’s property 
was being pursued through condemnation.”96 The court granted a 
preliminary injunction until a final disposition could be 
determined.97 
After a full hearing of the case, the court concluded that 
RLUIPA was applicable.98 It discussed at length the decisions in St. 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at *2. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at *3. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at *4. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at *8. 
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John’s and Faith Temple, but only briefly mentioned Cottonwood,99 
which might be read as agreement with the former courts on the 
issue of eminent domain. However, it attempted to avoid the 
eminent domain question by holding that “the RLUIPA challenge 
does not go to the actual taking, but rather the implementation of 
the open space plan which is a land use regulation.”100 At the same 
time, the court recognized the taking as “a method of 
implementation,”101 suggesting, perhaps unwittingly, that eminent 
domain could be classified as the application of a zoning or 
landmarking law under RLUIPA. The overall lack of careful analysis 
by the court undermines the authority of its conclusion that eminent 
domain falls outside of RLUIPA’s scope. 
C. Synthesizing and Reconciling the Case Law 
A review of the relevant case law leaves unsettled the issue of 
whether RLUIPA applies to eminent domain. In spite of the nearly 
categorical pronouncements in St. John’s and Faith Temple against 
the application of RLUIPA to eminent domain, those decisions 
focused criticism on the notion that all eminent domain proceedings 
fall within RLUIPA’s purview. But those cases do not stand for the 
proposition that RLUIPA should never apply. In fact, the St. John’s 
court specifically qualifies its ruling, saying that its holding “should 
not be taken to mean that all condemnation proceedings necessarily 
are outside the scope of RLUIPA.”102  
Moreover, the facts of each case distinguish the divergent 
holdings. While Faith Temple, St. John’s, and City of Honolulu all 
argued against application of RLUIPA,103 the eminent domain 
proceedings in those cases did not involve the close connection to 
zoning laws and apparent discriminatory intent at issue in 
Cottonwood and Albanian Associated Fund, where the facts strongly 
favored treatment of eminent domain as an application of zoning or 
landmarking laws.104 In fact, St. John’s involved airport expansion, 
not zoning-based redevelopment, and the city clearly made every 
 
 99. Id. at *8–9. 
 100. Id. at *8. 
 101. Id. 
 102. St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chi., 401 F. Supp. 2d 887, 900 (N.D. 
Ill. 2005), aff’d, 502 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2431 ( 2008).  
 103. See supra notes 49–86 and accompanying text. 
 104. See supra notes 32–48, 87–101 and accompanying text. 
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effort to accommodate the concerns of the religious groups affected 
while achieving the necessary ends of the project.105 However, in 
Cottonwood and Albanian Associated Fund, the municipal defendants 
appeared to be engaged in a bad faith attempt to prevent the 
religious land use desired by the plaintiffs. When efforts to deny the 
churches through ordinary zoning laws failed, the cities applied 
eminent domain as a means to further their discriminatory purposes. 
Thus, in spite of its distinct character, eminent domain represented 
an application of zoning or landmarking laws sufficient to invoke 
RLUIPA’s protections. If courts were to universally hold that 
eminent domain proceedings fell beyond RLUIPA’s proper scope, 
cities and municipal groups could simply exercise this power in a 
manner seemingly independent of their own zoning regulations and, 
in effect, frustrate the goals and purposes of RLUIPA. At the least, 
RLUIPA application seems appropriate in situations involving 
zoning-based redevelopment decisions subject to a high degree of 
discretion. 
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ZONING LAWS AND EMINENT 
DOMAIN 
Parts III and IV will address the principal justifications given in 
St. John’s and Faith Temple for denying application of RLUIPA to 
eminent domain—namely, the separate and distinct nature of zoning 
laws and eminent domain, and the absence of eminent domain in the 
statutory language and congressional record.106 Part III concerns the 
former, and Part IV the latter. 
At issue here is RLUIPA’s definition of “land use regulation” as 
“a zoning or landmarking law, or the application of such a law, that 
limits or restricts a claimant’s use or development of land.”107 In 
order for RLUIPA to apply, eminent domain proceedings must fall 
under this definition. St. John’s and Faith Temple would deny 
application, relying on the basic characterization of zoning laws and 
eminent domain as “‘two distinct concepts’ that involve land ‘in very 
different ways.’”108 Authority to enact zoning laws comes from the 
 
 105. See supra notes 62–76 and accompanying text. 
 106. See, e.g., supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text. 
 107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5) (2001). 
 108. St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chi., 502 F.3d 616, 640 (7th Cir. 
2007) (quoting Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F. Supp. 2d 250, 254 
(W.D.N.Y. 2005)), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2431 (2008). 
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police power, while authority to take property through eminent 
domain comes from the sovereignty of the state. These courts would 
argue that because the police power and eminent domain power 
derive from separate sources, RLUIPA’s definition of “land use 
regulation” includes the former, but excludes the latter.109  
This analysis of RLUIPA is insufficient for two reasons. First, it 
fails to take into account the degree to which eminent domain 
proceedings arise out of zoning laws and, as such, represent an 
application of those laws. Second, it ignores the ways in which the 
Supreme Court’s own takings jurisprudence has connected these two 
concepts. This Part will describe the legal character of zoning laws 
and eminent domain proceedings, and then demonstrate the causal 
nexus that links the two within the scope of RLUIPA. 
A. Police Power: Zoning Authority and Regulations 
The police power, as embodied in zoning laws and regulations, 
rests on the concept that private property owners are entitled to 
reasonable enjoyment of their property, “provided they [do] not 
interfere with their neighbors’ reasonable enjoyment of their 
properties and subject to reasonable regulations for the public 
good.”110 As the Supreme Court has said, the term generally 
“connotes the time-tested conceptional limit of public encroachment 
upon private interests.”111 More specifically, “the police power is the 
power of the sovereign to legislate in behalf of the public health, 
morals or safety by general regulations.”112  
In the context of land use regulation, the police power enables 
states to enact zoning laws that, among other things, 
regulate and restrict the height, number of stories and size of 
buildings and other structures, the percentage of lot that may be 
occupied, the size of yards, courts, and other open spaces, the 
density of population, and the location and use of buildings, 
structures and land for trade, industry, residence or other 
purposes.113 
 
 109. See id. 
 110. JULIUS L. SACKMAN ET AL., NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.42 (3d ed. 1950). 
 111. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962). 
 112. SACKMAN ET AL., supra note 110, § 1.42. 
 113. Faith Temple Church, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 254 (quoting N.Y. TOWN L. § 261). The 
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA), announced in 1922 by the United States 
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This includes the creation of residential, commercial, or industrial 
districts and, by extension, any development or redevelopment plan 
initiated by the city or municipal group in order to promote the 
public welfare.114 While local governments do not have independent 
police power authority, the states delegate zoning authority to them 
so that land use regulations are responsive to local issues and 
needs.115  
B. Eminent Domain Power 
The power of eminent domain, by contrast, derives from “the 
sovereignty of the state,” rather than any ownership or property 
rights.116 Eminent domain has been traced all the way back to the 
jurist Hugo Grotius, who described the power in 1625.117 Simply 
put, “[e]minent domain is the power of the sovereign to take 
property for public use without the owner’s consent.”118 Although it 
“does not require recognition by constitutional provision,”119 the 
power of eminent domain—along with its public use and just 
compensation requirements—is countenanced by the Fifth 
Amendment.120 Most state constitutions also include eminent 
 
Department of Commerce, also reflects the main goals and concerns of zoning laws. It stated 
that zoning laws should be enacted “to secure safety from fire, panic, and other dangers; to 
promote health and the general welfare; to provide adequate light and air; to prevent the 
overcrowding of land; to avoid undue concentration of population; [and] to facilitate the 
provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks, and other public requirements.” 
Advisory Comm. on Zoning, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, A Standard Zoning Enabling Act § 3 
(rev. ed. 1926), available at http://www.planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/SZEnabling 
Act1926.pdf. 
 114. Such zoning laws “are a relatively modern invention,” beginning around the turn of 
the twentieth century. Faith Temple Church, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 254 n.3 (citing Village of 
Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386 (1926)). 
 115. See, e.g., Flower Hill Bldg. Corp. v. Flower Hill, 100 N.Y.S.2d 903, 907–08 (Sup. 
Ct. 1950) (explaining how zoning laws protect communities through local zoning ordinances 
aimed at preventing disruptive zoning changes that would upset the local way of life, property 
values, and most desirable uses of land). 
 116. SACKMAN ET AL., supra note 110, § 1.13[4] (citing Shoemaker v. United States, 
147 U.S. 282, 296 (1893)). 
 117. See Welch v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 108 F.2d 95, 98 (6th Cir. 1939) (“The phrase 
‘eminent domain’ appears to have originated with Grotius who carefully described its nature, 
and the power is universal and as old as political society. The American Constitution did not 
change its scope or nature, but simply embodied it in the fundamental law.”); SACKMAN ET 
AL., supra note 110, § 1.12[1]. 
 118. SACKMAN ET AL., supra note 110, § 1.11. 
 119. Id. § 1.3. 
 120. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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domain provisions, which do not grant the power but act as positive 
limitations.121 Historically, governments have properly invoked 
eminent domain to acquire private property for building highways 
and railroads;122 to redevelop a blighted neighborhood;123 to 
eliminate the “social and economic evils of a land oligopoly”;124 to 
eliminate “a significant barrier to entry” into an important 
commercial market so as to enhance competition;125 and to 
reinvigorate a distressed local economy.126  
C. Causal Nexus: Police Power and Eminent Domain 
Based on the forgoing analysis, what generally “distinguishes 
eminent domain from the police power is that the former involves 
the taking of property because of its need for the public use while 
the latter involves the regulation of such property to prevent its use 
thereof in a manner that is detrimental to the public interest.”127 
However, because the nature of the two powers and their respective 
sources of authority differ, this distinction alone cannot provide a 
definitive answer to the question of RLUIPA’s applicability. Instead, 
we must seriously consider whether eminent domain proceedings 
constitute an application of zoning laws, as the Cottonwood court 
held, and to what degree the concepts have been conflated in takings 
jurisprudence. 
1. Application of zoning or landmarking laws 
For some scholars, common sense demands that eminent domain 
be treated as an application of zoning or landmarking laws for the 
purposes of RLUIPA analysis.128 After all, “any eminent domain 
action can likely be traced to a local government’s comprehensive 
plan or zoning system and can thus be considered the government’s 
application of a zoning law or landmarking law, subject to 
 
 121. SACKMAN ET AL., supra note 110, § 1.3. 
 122. See, e.g., Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 366 (1930); West River Bridge Co. v. 
Dix, 47 U.S. 507, 512 (1848). 
 123. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). 
 124. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241–42 (1984). 
 125. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1015 (1984). 
 126. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483 (2005). 
 127. SACKMAN ET AL., supra note 110, § 1.42 (emphasis in original). 
 128. See, e.g., Saxer, supra note 17, at 670; Mathues, supra note 17, at 1664–68. 
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RLUIPA.”129 Thus, the most “critical” aspect of RLUIPA’s 
applicability to eminent domain proceedings is the statute’s 
“application” clause, which broadens the scope of RLUIPA to cover 
“most condemnations . . . executed pursuant to a zoning system.”130 
In application, however, a majority of courts addressing this issue 
have failed to recognize RLUIPA’s “application” clause as sufficient 
to cover eminent domain proceedings.131 
The courts’ failure to find RLUIPA’s “application” clause as 
sufficient grounds for application to eminent domain proceedings 
results primarily from a lack of careful analysis of the clause itself. For 
example, the St. John’s and Faith Temple courts never examined the 
precise relationship between the zoning laws and condemnation 
proceedings. Instead, the courts quickly concluded that “the 
connection between the eminent domain proceedings and any . . . 
zoning laws is too attenuated to constitute the application of a 
zoning law.”132 In a subsequent case, the City of Honolulu court 
simply adopted the logic of St. John’s and Faith Temple—which 
rejected Cottonwood’s conclusions—without any discussion of 
whether the conversion action constituted an application of the city’s 
zoning laws.133 In Albanian Associated Fund, the court described the 
eminent domain proceedings in relation to the zoning laws at issue 
as a “method of implementation,” but strangely failed to discuss the 
significance of this characterization in light of RLUIPA’s application 
clause.134 
By contrast, “even while rejecting the plaintiffs’ request to apply 
RLUIPA to all condemnations,” the federal district court in St. 
John’s at least recognized the close relationship that can develop 
between zoning and eminent domain, and “pointed out that if the 
city condemned land and then rezoned the land, RLUIPA would 
likely come into play.”135 Whether courts carefully analyze the issue 
or not, the fact remains that when a governmental body initiates 
eminent domain proceedings to acquire land in furtherance of its 
 
 129. Saxer, supra note 17, at 670. 
 130. Mathues, supra note 17, at 1664. 
 131. See supra Part II. 
 132. Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F. Supp. 2d 250, 256 (W.D.N.Y. 
2005). 
 133. See supra notes 77–86 and accompanying text. 
 134. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 135. Mathues, supra note 17, at 1666. 
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land use goals and zoning system, it has effectively applied the 
zoning laws to the property. Stated plainly, “[t]his connection is real, 
not attenuated,”136 and courts would be wise to examine the facts of 
each case to determine the degree of connection. 
2. Takings jurisprudence and the coterminous relationship 
Courts denying application of RLUIPA to eminent domain also 
fail to recognize the ways in which the Supreme Court’s takings 
jurisprudence has linked the two concepts together.137 Despite the 
distinction drawn between police power regulations and eminent 
domain power takings, 
[f]rom one point of view there is a considerable resemblance 
between the police power and the power of eminent domain in that 
each power recognizes the superior right of the community against 
the selfishness of the individuals, the one preventing the use by an 
individual of his own property in his own way as against the general 
comfort and protection of the public, and the other depriving him 
of the right to obstruct the public necessity and convenience by 
obstinately refusing to part with his property when it is needed for 
the public use.138 
The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized this connection in 
its takings jurisprudence. As early as 1954 in Berman v. Parker, the 
Court asserted that the eminent domain public use requirement is 
met by a valid exercise of the police power, as determined by the 
legislative body; in other words, eminent domain can be an 
appropriate means of “executing the project” dictated by police 
power concerns.139 Therefore, the notion that eminent domain can 
represent the application of zoning laws based on the police power 
appears to be consistent with established Supreme Court doctrine.  
In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, the Court further 
clarified the relationship between police power and eminent domain, 
observing that “[t]he ‘public use’ requirement is thus coterminous 
with the scope of a sovereign’s police powers.”140 It then 
 
 136. Id. at 1667. 
 137. I am indebted to Professor John Fee for helping me develop this approach to the 
relationship between zoning laws and eminent domain. 
 138.  SACKMAN ET AL., supra note 110, § 1.42. 
 139. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32–33 (1954). 
 140. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984) (emphasis added). 
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acknowledged the narrow judicial role in reviewing legislative 
judgments, where “the eminent domain power is equated with the 
police power.”141 As with some of the RLUIPA cases described 
above, this connection between the exercise of police power and 
eminent domain is real, not attenuated.142  
In addition, a more recent and more controversial case, Kelo v. 
City of New London,143 clearly demonstrates how the relationship 
between the exercise of the police power and eminent domain works 
in practice. In Kelo, a local government, with the goal of furthering 
economic development in a distressed area, attempted to seize 
private property through eminent domain for the benefit of another 
private party.144 The Court held that the takings were constitutional, 
showing great deference to the city’s judgments concerning the 
problem of economic distress and the proposed solution: 
The City has carefully formulated an economic development plan 
that it believes will provide appreciable benefits to the community, 
including—but by no means limited to—new jobs and increased 
tax revenue. As with other exercises in urban planning and 
development, the City is endeavoring to coordinate a variety of 
commercial, residential, and recreational uses of land, with the 
hope that they will form a whole greater than the sum of its parts. 
To effectuate this plan, the City has invoked a state statute that 
specifically authorizes the use of eminent domain to promote 
economic development.145 
In other words, the exercise of eminent domain in this case 
represents a valid application of government police power, in the 
form of land use plans and zoning systems, to address a serious 
problem. 
Given the vagueness of several RLUIPA terms, courts should 
analyze their meaning with reference to the ways in which those 
terms are defined by the Supreme Court in analogous or similar 
contexts.146 The coterminous relationship between zoning laws and 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. See supra text accompanying note 136. 
 143. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 144. Id. at 473–75. 
 145. Id. at 483–84. 
 146. Courts and legislative bodies frequently employ this kind of analogical or 
comparative analysis to determine the meaning of unclear terms. In fact, RLUIPA’s own 
congressional record demonstrates this approach: 
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eminent domain established in the takings cases shows that 
condemnation proceedings can, and often do, represent an 
application of zoning laws. 
IV. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT: WHAT THE RECORD SHOWS 
As described above, courts rejecting the application of RLUIPA 
to eminent domain have also based this conclusion on the apparent 
lack of specific references to eminent domain in the statutory 
language and congressional record.147 While this is an attractive 
assertion, and courts should not “add language to the statute in 
order to stretch its applicability,”148 it should not be considered 
dispositive of the issue when the statute’s provisions and the 
congressional record imply a broader reading. Taken in totality, 
there is at least an equally reasonable argument that Congress did in 
fact intend for RLUIPA to apply in cases of eminent domain. 
A. RLUIPA’s Statutory Language and Construction 
Answering the question of whether Congress intended RLUIPA 
to cover eminent domain within its borders requires more than a 
literal reading of the statutory terms. From the start, we must 
concede that the terms “eminent domain,” “condemnation,” and 
“takings” are never mentioned by name in any of RLUIPA’s 
provisions. For some courts this is sufficient on its own, without 
delving into deeper analysis of the statute’s history and congressional 
record, to support the denial of RLUIPA protection.149 At the same 
time, however, the statute employs conspicuously broad terms, 
suggesting a more inclusive—and less literal—intent. Most 
significantly, Section 3 specifically mandates a broad construction of 
 
The Act does not include a definition of the term ‘substantial burden’ because it is 
not the intent of this Act to create a new standard for the definition of ‘substantial 
burden’ on religious exercise. Instead, that term as used in the Act should be 
interpreted by reference to Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
146 CONG. REC. S7776 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch and Sen. Edward M. 
Kennedy). 
 147. See, e.g., supra notes 58–59, 71, 75 and accompanying text. 
 148. Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F. Supp. 2d 259, 255 (W.D.N.Y. 
2005). 
 149. See, e.g., St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chi., 502 F.3d 616, 641 (7th 
Cir. 2007) (“Congress did not mention eminent domain in so many words in RLUIPA’s 
definition of a land use regulation, which is enough for us to consider it excluded.”), cert. 
denied, 128 S. Ct. 2431 (2008). 
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RLUIPA’s provisions: “This Act shall be construed in favor of a 
broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent 
permitted by the terms of this Act and the Constitution.”150 By itself, 
this clause seems to preclude the strictly literal reading imposed on 
the statute by some courts.151 
And yet, even without the clause, the open language of RLUIPA 
recommends a broader approach to its application. For example, 
“[t]he term ‘religious exercise’ includes any exercise of religion, 
whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious 
belief.”152 This definition is expansive and, on its face, appears to 
cover all religions and forms of religious action. Moreover, in 
contrast to the more limited scope of its predecessors—such as 
RFRA, which was based entirely on remedial powers derived from 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment—RLUIPA applies in three 
separate instances: (1) where the burden involves a federally funded 
program; (2) where the burden, or removal of the burden, affects 
interstate commerce; or (3) where the burden comes from the 
application of land use regulations that allow the government to 
make “individualized assessments of the proposed uses for the 
property involved.”153 While these alternative bases for jurisdiction 
were no doubt included partly to insulate RLUIPA from the 
constitutional challenges that ultimately doomed RFRA,154 their 
inclusion also clearly expresses a desire for broad applicability to 
religious land use cases. 
The call for broad construction of RLUIPA’s provisions further 
supports the arguments for application to eminent domain described 
in Part III. Given the real connection between zoning laws and 
eminent domain proceedings, a broad construction of the statute 
should comfortably allow for the classification of eminent domain as 
an application of zoning or landmarking laws. Courts that impose a 
strict construction on the statute’s terms to exclude eminent domain 
have, in fact, violated the statute’s broad construction clause. Those 
 
 150. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3 (2000). 
 151. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 152. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2000). 
 153. Id. §§ 2000cc-(a)(2)(A)–(C) (2000). 
 154. See 146 CONG. REC. S7775 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch and 
Sen. Edward M. Kennedy) (“The hearings also intensely examined Congress’s constitutional 
authority to enact this bill in light of recent developments in Supreme Court federalism 
doctrine.”). 
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courts that are faithful to the command have, as one scholar 
observes, produced broad results not literally required by the statute 
on its face.155 This includes the extension of “land use regulation” to 
cover both state and local regulations,156 and a determination that 
“nonaction [could] constitute an act pursuant to a zoning 
ordinance.”157 Extending the boundaries of RLUIPA to include 
eminent domain proceedings as an application of zoning or 
landmarking laws best effectuates RLUIPA’s broad intentions. 
Finally, with few exceptions, eminent domain proceedings clearly 
require government to make “individualized assessments of the 
proposed uses for the property involved.”158 Generally treated as the 
codification of free exercise doctrines laid down by the recent 
Supreme Court decisions in Smith and Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of 
Hialeah,159 RLUIPA’s jurisdictional hook thus brings eminent 
domain proceedings within the statute’s reach. The Cottonwood 
court describes how this applied to the particular facts of its case, 
stating that 
the Redevelopment Agency’s Resolution of Necessity and 
Defendants’ efforts to condemn the land are individualized 
assessments. By condemning the Cottonwood Property, the 
Redevelopment Agency had to come to the decision that the 
Cottonwood Property was blighted, that the Walker/Katella Retail 
 
 155. See Mathues, supra note 17, at 1666. 
 156. See Hale O Kaula Church v. Maui Planning Comm’n, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1070 
(D. Haw. 2002) (rejecting Maui County’s argument that state regulations merely “classified” 
land while only local authorities “zoned” land). 
 157. Mathues, supra note 17, at 1666 (citing Vineyard Christian Fellowship of Evanston, 
Inc. v. City of Evanston, 250 F. Supp. 2d 961, 990 (N.D. Ill. 2003)). 
 158. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-(a)(2)(C); see also Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free 
Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (arguing that land use regulations, including eminent domain 
proceedings, are not neutral and generally applicable laws). 
 159. See 146 CONG. REC. S7775–76 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch and 
Sen. Edward M. Kennedy) (citing those Supreme Court cases in discussion of the compelling 
interest standard invoked when “government makes such individualized assessments”); 
Mathues, supra note 17, at 1664 n.85 (“The ‘individualized assessments’ phrase follows the 
Smith Court’s distinction between laws which are ‘neutral and generally applicable’ and 
therefore subject only to rational basis review, and laws which are not neutral and generally 
applicable and still subject to strict scrutiny.”). But see Graff, supra note 12, at 514 (“RLUIPA 
represents a substantial departure from the individualized assessment doctrine as defined by the 
Supreme Court in Smith . . . .”). 
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Project was consistent with the Specific Plan and the LART plan, 
and that condemning the land was the only solution.160 
As the Cottonwood case illustrates, eminent domain proceedings 
rely on several individualized assessments of both the zoning laws the 
government applies and the proposed uses for the property by the 
owner. Considered broadly, RLUIPA’s individualized assessments 
prong expresses congressional intent that the statute apply to land 
use regulations where individualized assessments are necessary—and 
this includes eminent domain proceedings. 
B. The Congressional Record 
In addition to RLUIPA’s broad statutory language, the 
congressional record reveals more support for application of its 
protections to eminent domain proceedings against religious groups. 
Although the record contains no direct references to eminent 
domain, clear indications of the broad context of the bill and the 
overwhelming focus on religious discrimination in land use 
regulation suggests a more sweeping scope than has been applied by 
some courts. 
RLUIPA’s congressional record is replete with references to its 
predecessor bills, including RFRA and RLPA, which were much 
broader in scope. In his joint statement with Senator Edward M. 
Kennedy, Senator Orrin G. Hatch remarked that “[i]t is no secret 
that I would have preferred a broader bill [like RLPA] than the one 
before us today.”161 In fact, RLPA defined “land use regulation” as 
“a law or decision by a government that limits or restricts a private 
person’s uses or development of land,”162 which would have 
definitively included eminent domain proceedings. Later in the 
record, a statement by Senator Harry Reid explained the reason for 
the statute’s narrowing: 
[T]he legislation stalled in the Senate when legitimate concerns 
were raised that RLPA, as drafted, would supersede certain civil 
 
 160. Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. City of Cypress, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1223 (C.D. 
Cal. 2002). It should be noted that the Cottonwood court applied the individualized assessment 
doctrine under Smith rather than RLUIPA. However, since the standard in RLUIPA simply 
reflects the Smith Court’s decision, the difference is immaterial. 
 161. 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch and Sen. 
Edward M. Kennedy). 
 162. 145 CONG. REC. H5597 (1999) (statement of Rep. Nadler). 
BAKER.FIN 10/11/2008 1:47 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2008 
1238 
rights, particularly in areas relating to employment and housing. 
These concerns were most troubling to the gay and lesbian 
community. . . . [A]s I was considering the merits of [RLPA], these 
concerns weighted heavily upon my mind. . . . I am proud to have 
had the opportunity to work with Senators Hatch and Kennedy to 
accomplish the worthwhile endeavor of protecting legitimate civil 
rights while at the same time protecting the free exercise of religion 
involving land use decisions.163 
It was out of concern for certain civil rights, not for eminent 
domain power, that Congress decided to pass a more limited bill. As 
Professor Saxer observes, “there is no indication that Congress 
changed the definition language in order to restrict the type of land 
use decision subject to RLUIPA.”164 Thus, although RLUIPA’s 
definition of “land use regulation” seems narrower, this was 
intended to protect civil rights that might otherwise be jeopardized, 
not to exclude eminent domain or any other kind of land use 
decision from the statute’s scope. Indeed, Senator Edward Kennedy, 
one of RLUIPA’s co-sponsors, has proposed an amendment to 
RLUIPA to include eminent domain in order to “restore 
[RLUIPA’s] original intent and give religious assemblies and 
institutions specific protection against eminent domain abuse.”165  
In addition, the record’s consistent focus on the widespread 
pattern of religious discrimination in the land use context, and the 
resulting calls for legislative action further demonstrate congressional 
desire for broad application of RLUIPA protections.166 According to 
Congress, 
 
 163. 146 CONG. REC. S7778 (2000). 
 164. Saxer, supra note 17, at 668 (emphasis added). 
 165.  Lerman, supra note 17, at 2078 (quoting Letter from Sen. Coburn and Sen. 
Kennedy (June 30, 2006) (on file with the author)). While post-enactment statements are 
generally disfavored as proof of intention, it is worth noting that RLUIPA and its predecessors, 
RFRA and RLPA, were all enacted to restore religious protections removed by Supreme Court 
decisions. It is conceivable, then, that Senator Kennedy’s statement reflected a similar desire to 
restore protection against eminent domain removed by a majority of courts hearing RLUIPA 
cases in the eminent domain context. 
 166. Because the record of religious discrimination covers only the zoning and 
landmarking contexts, some might say that using it to justify application of RLUIPA to 
eminent domain requires an unreasonable stretch of logic. However, as shown by the 
Cottonwood and Albanian Associated Fund cases, local government bodies are starting to turn 
to eminent domain as a way to prevent religious land use that they do not want in their 
community. Moreover, the Kelo Court’s upholding of an eminent domain action for the 
purpose of economic development, even though the property was being transferred from one 
private party to another and the public benefit was unclear, raises the possibility that eminent 
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[t]he hearing record compiled massive evidence that this right [to 
assemble for religious purposes] is frequently violated. Churches in 
general, and new, small, or unfamiliar churches in particular, are 
frequently discriminated against on the face of zoning codes and 
also in the highly individualized and discretionary processes of land 
use regulation. Zoning codes frequently exclude churches in places 
where they permit theaters, meeting halls, and other places where 
large groups of people assemble for secular purposes. Or the codes 
permit churches only with individualized permission from the 
zoning board, and zoning boards use that authority in 
discriminatory ways.167 
In support of this broad pronouncement, the record includes 
numerous anecdotal references to religious land use discrimination 
across the country.168 John Mauck, a Chicago attorney specializing in 
land use cases, estimated that thirty percent of the cases in Chicago’s 
Zoning Appeals Board involve religious plaintiffs.169 
Beyond the anecdotal evidence, Congress relied on two 
significant statistical studies to substantiate the claim of widespread 
discrimination and the need for a legislative solution. First, Brigham 
Young University (BYU) conducted a study in which 196 cases 
involving both zoning board decisions and free exercise challenges 
were analyzed.170 One scholar summarized the study’s conclusions as 
follows: 
[S]mall religious groups, including Jews, small Christian 
denominations, and nondenominational churches, are vastly 
overrepresented in reported church zoning cases. Religious groups 
accounting for only 9% of the population account for 50% of the 
reported litigation involving location of churches, and 34% of the 
reported litigation involving accessory uses at existing churches.171 
 
domain might prove an easier hurdle to clear—especially if courts exclude eminent domain 
from RLUIPA’s protections. 
 167. 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch and Sen. 
Edward M. Kennedy). 
 168. See generally 146 CONG. REC. E1564 (2000) (statement of Rep. Henry J. Hyde). 
 169. Douglas Laycock, State RFRAs and Land Use Regulation, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
755, 773 (1999) (citing conversation with Mauck in Washington, D.C., on June 16, 1998). 
 170. Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearing on H.R. 4019 Before the Subcomm. 
on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 131–32, 141–46 (1998) 
(discussing the BYU study). 
 171. Laycock, supra note 169, at 770–71 (discussing the BYU study data). 
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A second survey focused on one of the larger, more prominent 
churches in the country—the Presbyterian Church—yielded a similar 
conclusion.172 According to the study, 10% of congregations 
reported “significant conflict” over land use permits, while another 
8% reported that conditions imposed by the government “increased 
the cost of the project by more than 10%.”173 As a result of the 
anecdotal and statistical evidence, Congress concluded that 
“discrimination against religious [land] uses is a nationwide 
problem” that requires immediate attention.174 
More recently, the evidence and conclusions reported in the 
congressional record have come under more focused scrutiny. Critics 
of RLUIPA have challenged the claim of widespread discrimination 
against religious land use that provided impetus for RLUIPA’s 
enactment.175 However, most of the criticism strikes at the fringes, 
and not at the heart, of the claims made during the congressional 
hearings. For example, Stephen Clowney’s empirical study, which he 
asserts “calls into question the wisdom of . . . federal involvement in 
local land use decisions,” was entirely limited to zoning processes in 
New Haven, Connecticut.176 Needless to say, the results from a study 
conducted in one city are hardly conclusive. Others have directed 
specific attacks at the methodology and conclusions of the BYU 
study.177 Furthermore, detractors also point out that the 
 
 172. Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearing on S.2148 Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 14–16 & Appendix, Question 9 (statement of Prof. Douglas 
Laycock, University of Texas) (reporting data from survey of Presbyterian congregations). 
 173. Laycock, supra note 169, at 772 (discussing Presbyterian study). 
 174. 146 CONG. REC. S7775 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch and Sen. 
Edward M. Kennedy). 
 175. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 13, at 346 (“The sheer size of the land use universe 
makes the record of unconstitutional conduct cited in the RLPA hearings not ‘massive,’ but 
rather minute.”); Stephen Clowney, Comment, An Empirical Look at Churches in the Zoning 
Process, 116 YALE L.J. 859, 863 (2007) (“[T]his Comment questions the prevailing belief that 
zoning ‘has become the most widespread obstacle to the free exercise of religion.’” (quoting 
Laycock, supra note 169, at 783)); Graff, supra note 12, at 503 (“Congress has failed to 
provide convincing evidence of pervasive religious discrimination in the application of land use 
regulations.”). 
 176. Clowney, supra note 175, at 859–60 (“[T]his Comment . . . scrutinize[s] the 
records of New Haven, Connecticut, to determine whether religious institutions are treated 
fairly in the zoning appeals process.”). 
 177. See Adams, supra note 12, at 2397–400 (arguing that the study relied too heavily on 
outdated statistics and was limited to zoning decisions appealed to the courts); Graff, supra 
note 12, at 501–02 (“Durham departed from his own methodology by including Judaism as a 
minority religion, as Jews constitute 2.2 percent of the population and exceed Durham’s 
threshold standard of 1.5 percent.”). It is difficult to see how the classification of Jews makes 
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congressional hearings failed to include “the most scientific study of 
land use data and churches” at that time.178 The National 
Congregations Study, a survey of 1236 congregations in a 
“representative national sample,” found that only one percent of 
churches reported denial of a permit or license.179 But it is difficult to 
say how much weight to give the study because it only included 
information on roughly half of one percent of congregations across 
the country. The authors of the study even included several 
disclaimers concerning the strength of the results in determining the 
extent of religious discrimination.180 Despite some contrary studies, 
the congressional record indicates through anecdotal and statistical 
evidence a high level of religious discrimination. 
It should be remembered that, after the compilation of the 
evidence in the congressional record, RLUIPA passed both houses of 
Congress unanimously.181 With its expansive view of the need to 
protect religious liberty demonstrated by the focus on evidence of 
discrimination, the congressional record provides further support for 
the application of eminent domain under RLUIPA. But for the civil 
rights challenges to its predecessor, there would be no need to make 
this argument at all.182 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the end, courts will continue to determine whether RLUIPA 
protects religious groups from discriminatory eminent domain 
proceedings. Unfortunately, most of the courts that have heard the 
issue have concluded that eminent domain falls outside the 
boundaries of RLUIPA. These decisions have ignored the broad 
statutory mandate, instead focusing on staid, traditional conceptions 
of zoning laws and eminent domain that do not reflect the current 
legal landscape or the vision of the Congress that enacted RLUIPA. 
 
any difference to the overall purpose of the study to show the prevalence of religious 
discrimination. Whether or not Jews are a minority religion, they were disproportionately 
involved in land use litigation. 
 178. Hamilton, supra note 13, at 351. 
 179. Mark Chaves & William Tsitsos, Are Congregations Constrained by Government? 
Empirical Results from the National Congregations Study, 42 J. CHURCH & ST. 335, 341 
(2000). 
 180. Id. at 341–42. 
 181. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 182.  See supra notes 161–164 and accompanying text.  
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Eminent domain proceedings almost always involve the application 
of zoning laws and regulations. This relationship is clear from the 
RLUIPA cases described above, from the Supreme Court’s own 
takings jurisprudence, and from the intent of Congress demonstrated 
in the broad statutory language and congressional record. The 
Cottonwood court got the question first, and got it right. With any 
luck going forward, courts will glean from its analysis what should 
have been evident all along: RLUIPA favors expansion. 
Matthew Baker 
